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Abstract 
Mainstream organizations typically struggle in their quest to combine effectiveness with efficiency, or 
reliability with flexibility. Experimentation and trial-and-error are regarded as important processes 
for organizational learning, but do not always lead to an organizational-wide optimum in terms of 
efficiency. Certain organizations, so-called High Reliability Organizations (HROs), exist that operate 
in hazardous environments but manage to structure themselves to be efficient and stay highly reliable. 
These organizations in high-tension industries are deprived from the luxury of going through trial-
and-error learning, but we state that exactly this is accountable for the HROs’ success. Through a 
case study of the IT Incident Management process at a large European financial services provider, we 
investigate how people involved in a process of such a mainstream organization, where reliability is of 
great concern, can learn from HROs to achieve a greater reliability while working efficiently. It 
appears that the characteristics that make an HRO distinct from other organizations are – at least to 
some extent – present in the IT Incident Management process. Our main conclusion however is that 
considerable opportunities remain unseized to lift the HRO qualities to a still higher level. 
Keywords: Incident Management process, Organizational learning, High Reliability Organizations. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Today’s organizations are characterized by ‘raplex’ – rapidly evolving and complex – contexts in 
terms of technology, competition, legal and institutional obligations (Nooteboom, 1998). Only those 
organizations survive and prosper that are capable of dealing with these raplex conditions. 
Organizations need to be flexible in order to respond to raplex conditions swiftly or, even better, 
anticipating them (Hong et al., 2004). In organization theory, this paradigm is known as 
‘Organizational Learning’. An organization that demonstrates organizational learning in a durable and 
semi-continuous way is known as a ‘Learning Organization’ (LO). 
From an efficiency perspective, it can be said that an organization’s components have to be tightly 
coupled (Wolf, 2001). Indeed, when the processes between individuals, subunits, ideas, procedures, 
hierarchical levels (Orton & Weick, 1990) are integrated as far and smoothly as possible, costs will be 
the lowest, time will be saved and the least energy and resources will be wasted. Through 
organizational learning’s highly praised processes of trial-and-error (Aase & Nybø, 2005), the 
aforementioned organizational components learn which activities yield the highest performance for 
themselves and the organization as a whole.  
Paradoxically, because of the difficulty to realize the necessary mutual adjustments, organization 
members notice that the probability of achieving the ideal situation of tight-coupling on an 
organization-wide level is too low to be worth striving for. Moreover, they realize that such a strategy 
would go at the expense of their own component’s efficiency. For this reason, actions are often 
adjusted in view of a sublevel’s optimum (Denrell). The result is a sub-organizational optimum and an 
organizational suboptimum, the overall result being a loosely coupled and not optimally efficient 
organization.  
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are organizations that have histories of very safe operations 
although they operate in environments where accidents could have an enormous impact (Roberts & 
Libuser, 1993), like aircraft carriers (e.g. Rochlin et al., 1987) and organizations in the nuclear 
industry (e.g. Roberts, 1990). HROs are exhibiting a rare combination of reliability and flexibility, of 
effectiveness and efficiency (Van Den Eede et al., 2004). 
We argue that because of the absence of ‘trial’-and-error learning in these high hazard environments, 
the actors in HROs will not ‘learn’ that it is wiser to pursue their own optimum. Instead, they will 
continue to pursue the image of a tightly-coupled organization. The result thereof is efficiency. As 
such, we state that the fact of being deprived from the luxury to go through a lot of trial-and-error 
learning is accountable for the HROs’ success. However, as we have mentioned above, organizations 
do not only need to be efficient, they need to be reliable as well. This calls for a balancing act between 
tighter and looser coupling. As we will see, HROs exhibit five different antidotes for tight-coupling. 
The result is an organization that combines the best of tight-coupling with the best of loose-coupling. 
In this contribution we want to investigate how an organization operating in raplex conditions can 
learn from HROs in being both efficient and reliable, despite the fact of an absence of organizational 
learning’s characteristic trial-and-error processes. 
In the subsequent section we will describe HROs and their characteristics that make them highly 
reliable while staying efficient. Next, we will present a case study of the IT Incident Management 
process at a large financial institution. Through an ethnographic study we examined how they can 
learn from HROs to balance both virtues of reliability/effectiveness and flexibility/efficiency. 
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2 HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
An organization is exposed to all kinds of threats from various internal and external sources. The 
organization may protect itself from these threats, but threats can still cause an organizational accident, 
as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1997) 
James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1997) is a metaphor stating that an organization’s barriers of 
defense can be thought of as the slices of a Swiss Cheese. Each defense is not always functioning 
optimally and may contain holes, which are at different ‘locations’ in the different slices. In addition, 
when one hole is plugged, another one may emerge elsewhere. If at one point in time, all holes happen 
to line-up, a latent danger becomes manifest as it bypasses all built-in defense mechanisms causing an 
organizational accident. 
Organizations operating under high-risk circumstances are very vigilant on avoiding accidents, 
because their occurrence would have disastrous consequences, either for the organization itself or for 
the public. Despite the fact that they operate under trying conditions, they have less than their fair 
share of accidents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 9). Such organizations are labeled “High Reliability 
Organizations” (HROs) and can be identified “by asking the question: ‘How often could this 
organization have failed with dramatic consequences?’. If the answer to the question is many 
thousands of times, the organization is highly reliable.” (Roberts, 1990) 
Processes in HROs are distinctive because they focus on failure rather than success, inertia as well as 
change, tactics rather than strategy, the present moment rather than the future, and resilience as well as 
anticipation (Weick et al., 1999). 
Early characterizations of HROs emphasized the total elimination of error, while later on researchers 
concluded that errors are inevitable and HROs are not error-free, but that errors do not disable them 
(Weick, 1987; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 14). Effective HROs are known by their capability to 
contain and recover from the errors they make and by their capability to have foresight into errors they 
might make. Reliability is the number one concern for HROs (Weick et al., 1999; Roberts, 1990). 
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2.2 Characteristics of High Reliability Organizations 
HROs are so reliable because they have a certain state of ‘mindfulness’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 
42). According to Weick et al. (1999), mindfulness is less about decision-making, which is the 
traditional focus of organizational theory and accident prevention, and more about inquiry and 
interpretation grounded in capabilities for action. HROs possess five key qualities to reach their state 
of mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999), represented in Figure 2. These qualities enable HROs to 
compensate for their inherent tight-coupling with attributes that loosen their coupling, hence 
contributing to a balance between efficiency and reliability. Through their preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to accept simplifications, and sensitivity to operations, HROs are able to anticipate and 
become aware of dangers. HROs are able to contain dangers when they are spotted because they are 
sensitive to their operations, committed to resilience and deferred to expertise. 
Preoccupation
with Failure
Reluctance to
Simplify
Sensitivity to
Operations
Commitment
to Resilience
Deference to
Expertise
Mindfulness
Mindful
anticipation
Reliability
Capability to Discover
Unexpected Events
Capability to Manage
Unexpected Events
Mindful
containment
 
Figure 2. A Mindful Infrastructure for High Reliability (adapted from Weick et al., 1999) 
In the remainder of this section, we outline the different HRO principles that make up the mindfulness 
of an HRO, drawing heavily from the extensive body of research by Weick and co-workers (Weick et 
al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Preoccupation with failure 
Preoccupation with failure is an important principle that gives HROs a distinctive quality, for HROs 
are preoccupied with something they seldom see. Although HROs are successful in avoiding incidents, 
they do not boast about their superiority. HROs are wary for the common failures after success, caused 
by restricted search, reduced attention, inertia, risk aversion, and homogeneity. They treat even the 
smallest error as a sign that something could be wrong with the system, i.e. with one of the defense 
layers, and they are anxious that the holes in the cheese might line up. HROs regard close calls as a 
kind of failure that reveals danger, and not, as most other organizations would do, as evidence of 
success and their ability to avoid accidents. Members of HROs know that they cannot foresee 
everything: They know that they do not know, and they expect to be surprised. That is why members 
of HROs are constantly worried that they make analytical errors and that these errors might be 
amplified, in combination with limitations to foresight, and lead to accidents. 
Reluctance to simplify 
HROs take deliberate steps to create more complete and differentiated pictures of what is going on. 
Because HROs believe that the world they face is complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable, 
they try to notice as much as possible. Simplifications produce blind spots, so HROs differentiate in 
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order to get a more varied picture of potential consequences and in turn a richer and more varied set of 
precautions and early warning signals. 
HROs make fewer assumptions, cultivate requisite variety and socialize people to notice more. The 
law of requisite variety was originally proposed by Ashby (1958), and suggests that the larger the 
variety of actions available to a system, the larger the variety of perturbations in its environment it can 
compensate. HROs stimulate frequent job rotation and hire employees with non-typical prior 
experience. By these means HROs obtain a broader divergence of perspectives, which leads to a 
broader set of assumptions that sensitize it to a greater variety of inputs. Diverse groups have more 
information available than more homogeneous groups, but communication patterns and cognitive 
limitations often lead to a situation where unique information does not get shared. Unique knowledge 
must be surfaced. Rutkowski et al. (2006) studied the use of a group decision support system (GDSS) 
to identify unique but hidden knowledge that resides in a group. This unique knowledge appeared to 
be of key importance and would not have been shared without the use of the GDSS. 
Sensitivity to operations 
HROs try to signal errors when they are still tractable and can still be isolated by attaining well-
developed situational awareness. Situational awareness is defined by Endsley (1997) as “the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space; the comprehension 
of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”. Sensitivity to operations is about 
the overview of the ‘Swiss Cheese’ and constantly trying to find out where the holes are located in the 
cheese. HROs consistently communicate the big picture of what the organization seeks to do, and try 
to get everyone to communicate with each other about how they fit in the big picture (Roberts & Bea, 
2001). With a situational awareness and a big picture, people in HROs can make continuous 
adjustments that prevent errors from accumulating and enlarging. 
Sensitivity to operations is achieved through a combination of shared mental representations, 
collective story building, situation assessing with continual updates, knowledge of physical 
interconnections and parameters of the organization’s systems, and active diagnosis of the limitations 
of preplanned procedures. 
Commitment to resilience 
Resilience is a combination of keeping errors small and improvising workarounds to keep the system 
functioning. People in HROs are so committed to resilience, that they see this ‘firefighting’ as 
evidence that they are able to contain the unexpected. In contrary, managers in business may perceive 
successful firefighting as evidence that they are distracted and therefore unable to do their normal 
work (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 70). 
HROs need to have a broad repertoire of actions they can make use of when a danger occurs. HROs 
support improvisation to be able to recombine the actions in their repertoire into novel combinations. 
As Wildavsky (1988 p 70) describes, “improvement in overall capability, i.e. a generalized capacity to 
investigate, to learn, and to act, without knowing in advance what one will be called to act upon, is a 
vital protection against unexpected hazards”. Informal networks are a common resource for HROs to 
respond to dangers resiliently, because they provide an infrastructure that is needed to handle 
unanticipated dangers in a swiftly manner. When events get outside of normal operational boundaries, 
knowledgeable people organize themselves into ad hoc networks to provide expert problem solving. 
Deference to expertise 
What people in HROs have mastered is the ability to alter typical hierarchical patterns of deference 
when the tempo of operations changes and unexpected problems arise. Decisions are then made on the 
front line by people who have the most expertise, regardless of their rank. In these situations, expertise 
and experience are usually more important than rank, so the decision structure in HROs is a hybrid of 
hierarchy and specialization. This shift to anarchy comes from a collective, cultural belief that the 
necessary capabilities lie somewhere in the system and that migrating problems will find them. 
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3 CASE STUDY: THE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
3.1 Introduction 
Financial institutions are supposed above all other virtues to be trustworthy (Heller & Willatt, 1977 p 
11). The fundamental commodity in which financial institutions deal is not money but confidence, and 
a loss of confidence, unlike loss of money, cannot be dealt with simply by a write-off in the balance 
sheet (Heller & Willatt, 1977 p 16). In other words, a financial institution must be reliable. 
In this section, we report on an extensive research program we conducted of the IT Incident 
Management process at a large European financial services provider active in the fields of banking and 
insurance. The objective of our research was to investigate how the people involved in the Incident 
Management process can learn from HROs to achieve a greater reliability. The financial institution has 
branches all over the world and offers its services to millions of clients, individual clients as well as 
retail clients and multinational companies. The financial institution holds a Euro zone top 20 ranking 
in terms of market capitalization. The financial institution’s IT department employs about 2,000 
people. 
The Incident Management process is part of a larger framework for best practices in IT service 
management, the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). The primary goal of the 
Incident Management process is to restore normal service operations as quickly as possible and to 
minimize the adverse impact on business operations, thus ensuring that the best possible levels of 
service quality and availability are maintained. An incident is defined as “any event which is not part 
of the standard operation of a service and which causes, or may cause, an interruption to, or a 
reduction in, the quality of that service” (Central Computer & Telecommunications Agency, 2000 p 
71). This can vary from smaller incidents (e.g. a printer that does not work) to incidents with a higher 
impact (e.g. a mainframe failure). 
3.2 Organization of the Incident Management process 
Figure 3 shows the organization of the Incident Management process at the financial institution. 
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IT Department
Business
Department
DivisionDivisionDivision
Incident
handling team
Incident
handling team
Incident
handling team
Incident
handler
Incident
handler
Incident
handler
Incident
handler
Organizer
Incident Manager
Service Delivery
Owner (SDO)
Incident
Coordinator (IC)
Team leader
Incident Management Hierarchy
=
=
=
=
 
Figure 3. Organization of the Incident Management process 
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Coordination across the IT department 
The financial institution has a special Service Management division that coordinates the ITIL 
processes throughout the organization. One of the Service Management division’s staff members is the 
Incident Management process owner, in ITIL referred to as the Incident Manager. The Incident 
Manager is responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Incident Management process. The 
Incident Manager monitors the Incident Management process, maintains the Incident Management 
application, and makes recommendations for improvement. The financial institution uses a special IT 
Service Management application suite, Peregrine Systems’ ServiceCenter, which is designed to 
support ITIL’s best practices. 
Organization within service domains 
The financial institution offers many services to their customers, e.g. asset management activities, 
financial transactions, and online banking. To support all these services, many internal services have 
to be in place. The financial institution has split up all her activities into service domains, and each of 
the over 70 service domains maintains one internal or external service. Every service domain has a 
Service Delivery Owner (SDO), who is responsible for supporting the service domain by the IT 
department. The SDO has a good overview of all activities within a service domain, from the IT 
department to the users in the business divisions, and is therefore an important contact person when 
incidents occur in a service domain. In literature on organization theory this role is known as 
‘boundary spanner’ as it enables transgressing the departmental boundaries (Williams, 2002). 
Organization within divisions of the IT department 
Each division has its own Incident Coordinator (IC), who is responsible for the Incident Management 
activities within his division. The IC coordinates the Incident Management activities of the teams in 
his division and communicates with the SDO when a higher priority incident occurs. ICs provide the 
Incident Manager of recommendations for improvement of the Incident Management process. 
Organization within incident teams 
Each incident handling team has a team leader who is the contact person for the team. 
3.3 Incident handling process 
Once an incident is detected, it goes trough different steps before it can be closed. 
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Figure 4. The Incident life cycle 
(adapted from Central Computer & Telecommunications Agency, 2000) 
582
It is important to note that an incident is constantly monitored by the owner of an incident, who makes 
sure the agreed resolution time is not exceeded and who communicates the status of the incident to the 
user. 
The incident life cycle as shown in Figure 4 consists of incident detection and recording, classification 
and assignment, investigation and diagnosis, resolution and recovery, and finally incident closure. We 
will shortly describe these different steps next. 
Incident detection and recording 
When a user encounters difficulties in continuing her work, she calls the Service Desk, the first-line 
support for incident handling in the organization. It is an easy to memorize number, **505, because it 
visually resembles the word “SOS”. If the difficulty cannot be solved immediately, the Service Desk 
registers it as an incident. An incident ticket is then created in Peregrine and all possible incident 
details are entered in the ticket. From this point onwards, the Service Desk is the owner of the incident 
and is responsible for the timely handling of the incident and the communication to the user. The user 
needs to be updated regularly on the status of the incident. An incident can also be detected by 
operational personnel. Operational personnel could either be the cause of the incident, or they were 
just able to detect the incident in their day-to-day activities before a user noticed any service 
disruption. In this case it is a common procedure that they register the incident in Peregrine. They will 
then be the owner of the incident and coordinate the incident until it is solved. In the remainder of this 
research we will focus on the normal procedure that the Service Desk coordinates incidents. 
Classification and assignment 
By asking targeted questions, the Call Desk can estimate the priority of the incident. The priority is set 
by determining the impact and urgency of the incident. The impact of the incident must be determined 
from the company’s perspective and indicates the (potential) financial loss the incident can cause. 
It is possible that the Service Desk is able to handle the incident, but cannot do this immediately. The 
incident is then assigned to the Service Desk. In most cases the Service Desk does not know what is 
causing the incident or how to solve it, so they must make an appeal to people with more expertise: 
second-line support groups, having more specialist skills, time or other resources to solve incidents. 
Because the Service Desk inquired the user about the incident, they will have an idea on what could be 
causing the incident or at least in what area to start investigating it. In Peregrine a list of teams appears 
that could be consulted for this kind of incident. The Service Desk assigns the most suitable team – in 
their view – to handle the incident. 
People from the IT department are split up into teams that each has their own specialization. These are 
virtual teams, because they could comprise people who work in different divisions and/or at different 
locations. They all have access to Peregrine, and when an incident is assigned to a team, it appears in 
the mailbox of the specific team and each team member can assign the incident to himself or herself. 
The team member that assigns the incident to himself/herself is called the incident handler. When the 
incident appears is assigned to the wrong team, it is sent back to the sender. 
Investigation and diagnosis 
The incident handler will investigate the incident and try to find a solution or a workaround. It is 
possible that a solution can only be implemented after some time, e.g. at a new release. A workaround 
could be suggested that will help the user until the real solution is implemented. When a team member 
cannot identify the underlying cause of the incident and propose a solution or workaround to it, the 
incident can be further rerouted to a higher-line support group, even an external vendor, until a 
solution to the incident is found. 
Resolution and recovery 
The incident handler implements the solution or the workaround, takes all necessary recovery actions 
and updates the documentation of the incident in Peregrine by describing how she solved the incident. 
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Incident closure 
The Service Desk contacts the user to make sure the proposed solution is satisfactory. If this is not the 
case, the incident is sent back to the incident handler. The Service Desk closes the incident when the 
user is satisfied with the proposed solution. 
Incident briefing 
Every morning the most important incidents that occurred the day before or the incidents that are still 
in the process of being handled are discussed. Employees who solved the incident or who know more 
about it, explain the cause of the incident and the (proposed) solution to a public comprising general 
managers, incident process coordinators, service delivery owners, and other IT staff that is involved in 
Incident Management or just is interested. The briefing can be attended ‘live’ at the head office of the 
financial institution or at another office via videoconference. Incidents are thoroughly analyzed and 
measures are taken to prevent the same kind of incident in the future. 
4 OBSERVATIONS 
For this work we applied a qualitative research approach using ethnography (Agar 1986; Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 1995; Myers 1999). We performed more than 800 hours of observations at the financial 
institution to obtain a clear picture of how the financial institution handles IT-related incidents. In this 
time frame we followed all the important actors of the Incident Management process, who are depicted 
in figure 3, in their daily work: the incident manager, the service delivery owners, the incident 
coordinators, the team leaders and some of the incident handlers. The hours at the financial institution 
were mainly spent on observation, general discussions with the people about their work, attending 
incident briefings and Incident Management process evaluation meetings, studying the previous 
Incident Management data from the Peregrine application and studying internal reports. Data analysis 
was conducted by interpreting the transcripts of our observations. Through this active observation, we 
were able to examine the mindful infrastructure that is in place at the Incident Management process. 
We will give an overview of the HRO characteristics of the Incident Management process according 
to the five HRO principles that make up the mindful infrastructure as shown in figure 2. 
Preoccupation with failure 
There is a good infrastructure in place to report incidents, and employees use it frequently. We have 
noticed that, even when a small error occurs, people jump in to intervene and offer their assistance. A 
good example of their preoccupation with failure is the establishment of the incident briefing. 
However, not everybody in the organization is aware of the importance of learning from incidents 
through such a briefing. Only the highest priority incidents are discussed at the incident briefing. Some 
employees apparently do not feel like justifying their way of handling incidents, and so label and 
incident with a lower than actual priority in order to avoid having to appear at the incident briefings. 
There are procedures in place how to handle certain incidents. But because of time pressure, 
procedures are not always updated after handling a new kind of incident, or are not entered in detail. A 
second-line incident handler expressed us his concern about such incomplete information in 
procedures: “I easily loose ten to fifteen minutes when I am dealing with incomplete information. But 
what if for one reason or another that slack time would not be available?” This employee was very 
concerned that he might face surprises that lead to failures, but apparently not everybody in the 
organization is that preoccupied. 
Reluctance to simplify 
The financial institution stimulates diversity in their staff by hiring people with non-typical experience 
for their job. For example, at one specific division of the IT department from where we were doing our 
research, out of about twelve staff members there were not even two people with the same background 
education. Moreover, the financial institution stimulates job rotation, which also contributes to the 
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requisite variety in their staff. Because the people are so divergent, the situations they face can be 
viewed from many different perspectives. This creates skepticism, leading to an instructive climate 
when people interact with one another and a qualitatively better assessment of the situation. 
To oversee the complexity of the processes involved, the financial institution appointed Service 
Delivery Owners. Service Delivery Owners are the “boundary spanners” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 
11) who enable a successful end-to-end service throughout the organization. 
However, at some points the financial institution does simplify. Key Performance Indicators, 
frequently applied by mainstream organizations (Van Den Eede et al., 2006), are used to measure the 
performance of different incident solving teams in a standardized manner. Mainly by paying attention 
to these evaluation criteria, incident handlers could loose their focus on other aspects of their work. 
Sensitivity to operations 
Several means are used to develop a strong situational awareness at the financial institution. There is a 
good intranet in place, where the latest developments are communicated and exhaustive information is 
available about the day-to-day activities of all divisions and teams. There are various internal 
magazines and news bulletins that communicate the big picture of the organization. Monthly an 
internal news report is shown in the theatre of the financial institution, every episode showing a.o. a 
different employee who is followed on a normal working day. There are monthly briefings by the 
Chief Information Officer to communicate the future plans of the IT department and to give an 
opportunity for discussion and feedback. The financial institution’s external strategies are also 
elucidated by means of these media. There was for example an advertising campaign on national 
television, and the purpose of this campaign was explained on the intranet. 
Commitment to resilience 
The incident handlers we have interviewed were all very committed to their work in resiliently 
responding to incidents. They spoke about their work with passion and regarded themselves 
irreplaceable in their ‘firefighting’. The financial institution shows their commitment to resilience in 
the incident briefings discussed previously. There is a good resilient infrastructure in place by informal 
networks. People have their connections throughout the organization and therefore perfectly know 
whom to contact when a critical situation arises. 
However, there is not much time for training in handling incidents. As a senior executive stated, “this 
is a waist of time, because there are many incidents in real-life that incident handlers can learn from”. 
Deference to expertise 
Incident handlers at the financial institution make up the front-line for responding to incidents. When 
an incident occurs, there sometimes is hardly any time to ask superiors for permission to take 
important decisions. Incident handlers are allowed to make these important decisions when the 
necessity emerges and there are no procedures to handle them. Later on, incident handlers must justify 
their actions, but there will be no penalty for bypassing their superiors. It is remarkable that this is not 
documented anywhere, but all incident handlers agreed that this was a common practice. 
5 DISCUSSION 
All HRO characteristics are – at least to some extent – present in the Incident Management process. 
However, the findings from the case study show that there are also indications of less mindful and 
non-HRO like behavior. HROs have different mechanisms at their disposal to improve the level of 
mindfulness. Therefore, our main conclusion is that considerable opportunities remain unseized to lift 
the HRO qualities to a still higher level. In this respect we advise the financial institution to improve 
their level of mindfulness. As Roberts and Bea (2001) state, HROs invest disproportionately more 
money in training people to recognize and respond to anomalies than other organizations. Training 
does not only teach people how to react to specific situations, but also how to respond to situations 
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that are not in the training manual (Roberts & Bea, 2001). Employees in HROs also learn to develop 
responses that can detect dangers (Roberts & Bea, 2001). 
HROs invest a lot of time in reviews in order to learn from their incidents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 
41). Incident analysis helps in building an organizational memory of what happened and why, 
develops a science of incidents that can happen in the organization and identifies parts of the system 
that should have redundancies (Roberts & Bea, 2001). Cooke (2003) calls this an “incident learning 
system”: “the collection of organizational capabilities that enable the organization to extract useful 
information from incidents of all kinds and to use this information to improve organizational 
performance over time”. According to Cooke (2003), an effective incident learning system is 
important for continuous improvement of the capability of the Incident Management process. Without 
such a system, pre-cursor incidents are only visible with the benefit of hindsight. But with an incident 
learning system in place, an organization can prevent serious accidents and may involve into an HRO 
over time (Cooke, 2003). The incident briefing set up by the financial institution is good step in the 
direction of such an incident learning system. 
Another way of becoming more aware of dangers, and training incident handlers in becoming more 
resilient, is by simulating an incident in the organization. Simulated incidents reinforce the idea that 
people must not become complacent, that the organization believes that accidents might happen, and 
that it worries about its ability to respond (Roberts & Bea, 2001). It also teaches people in the 
organization to formulate appropriate responses in new situations and gives people the opportunity to 
see what responses work and how, so they can locate the weak spots in their organization (Roberts & 
Bea, 2001). 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have built up a discussion that confronts a trusted principle from Organizational 
Learning – learning through trial and error processes – with insights from High Reliability 
Organizations. The paradox consists of the fact that organizational learning – at least the mutual 
learning aspects of it – contribute to a loosely coupled organization and a suboptimal performance. We 
have argued that because of the absence of trial-and-error learning in high hazard environments, HROs 
are more successful than Learning Organizations in terms of efficiency. 
Organizations do not only need to be efficient, they need to be reliable as well. Reliability is the 
number one concern for HROs. HROs manage to operate efficiently while staying highly reliable 
because they have a certain state of mindfulness, the general term for the five distinctive qualities they 
possess. 
Through a case study of the IT Incident Management process at a large European financial services 
provider, we investigated how people involved in a process of such a mainstream organization, where 
reliability is of great concern, can learn from HROs to balance both virtues of reliability/effectiveness 
and flexibility/efficiency. Our observations suggest that HROs may offer valuable insights for 
mainstream organizations like financial institutions on how to improve their level of mindfulness. 
There are some examples of past studies that look at mainstream organizations from an HRO 
perspective, e.g. investment banks (Roberts & Libuser, 1993) and software firms (Vogus & 
Welbourne, 2003), but the principles that make a HRO highly reliable have not been examined as 
detailed before at non-HROs. Although this study has been carried out at the idiosyncratic context of 
the IT department of a large financial institution, an environment characterized by critical business 
processes and high awareness of the potential impact of incidents, we expect our conclusions to be 
applicable to other high hazard environments as well. The validation of this assumption will however 
require further research in these environments. 
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